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Juvenile Law: A Year in Review
Roya R. Hough*
I. INTRODUCTION
1997 brought significant legislative changes on behalf of the children of the
State of Missouri. House Bill 343 made sweeping changes to Missouri Revised
Statutes Chapter 453, concerning adoptions, and Missouri Revised Statutes
Chapter 211, concerning termination of parental rights. On November 13, 1997,
President Clinton signed House Resolution 867, which became the "Adoption
and Safe Families Act of 1997," in an effort to provide permanent homes to
children too long in foster care, as well as to ensure that their safety is the
primary consideration when making decisions concerning their placement. This
Article will discuss these changes, as well as several Missouri cases of interest.
I. HOUSE BiLL 343
As a result of the efforts of representatives from a multitude of professional
organizations interested in child welfare, House Bill 343, passed in 1997,
attempts to standardize adoption procedure throughout the state by making
changes to the putative father registry,' adoption procedure,2 and the criminal
code. In addition, Missouri Revised Statutes § 211.447, concerning terminations
of parental rights, was amended to provide additional grounds to free children
who cannot be reunited with their families for adoption.
A. Missouri Revised Statutes Chapter 453
The most significant changes House Bill 343 made are found in Missouri
Revised Statutes Chapter 453, which deals with adoptions. The philosophy
behind the "Multiethnic Placement Act" is now codified in Missouri Revised
Statutes § 453.005, which provides that all persons making child placements
shall recruit potential homes that are ethnically and culturally diverse.3
Consideration also must be given to a child's cultural, racial and ethnic
background when determining whether a potential adoptive placement is
appropriate and whether the adoptive family is capable of meeting the ethnic
and cultural needs of the child. These issues must be considered on an
* Attorney, Division of Legal Services, Missouri Department of Social Services,
Jefferson City, Missouri; J.D. 1990, University of Missouri-Columbia.
1. Mo. REV. STAT. § 192.016 (Supp. 1997).
2. Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.005 (Supp. 1997).
3. Mo. REv. STAT. § 453.005 (Supp. 1997).
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individual basis and are to be included in the determination of whether a
particular placement is in the child's best interest.4
Petitions for adoption now must be filed in the juvenile court where the
petitioners reside, where the child was born, where the child is located, or where
either birth parent resides.5 If, at the time of the filing of the petition, there is an
action pending pursuant to Missouri Revised Statutes Chapter 211, the petition
must be filed with that court; the cause may be transferred to another appropriate
venue upon the motion of a party and the consent of the court to which the cause
is to be transferred.6 Although Missouri Revised Statutes § 453.010.4 provides
that a court shall hear a properly filed petition for adoption in a timely fashion,
no specific time frame is provided.7
1. Missouri Revised Statutes §§ 453.030
and 453.040: Consent to Adoption
Probably the most significant changes to Chapter 453 were made to
Missouri Revised Statutes §§ 453.030 and 453.040, pertaining to consent to
adoption. Section 453.030.3 provides that consent to an adoption is required
from: the mother of the child; a man who is the presumed father pursuant to
Missouri Revised Statutes § 210.822.1 (1), (2), (3) or (5); a man who has filed,
pursuant to Missouri Revised Statutes § 192.016, a notice of intent to claim
paternity or acknowledgment of paternity either prior to the child's birth or
within fifteen days of birth; a man that has filed an action to establish his
paternity within fifteen days of the child's birth; or the child's current adoptive
parents or other legally recognized mother and father.8 The amendments create
a major exception concerning men who, prior to the amendments, might
otherwise have been required to provide consent to the adoption. Under the
amended Section 193.087, there are no time requirements for filing an affidavit
acknowledging paternity with the Department of Health. Thus, for example, a
man would not be required to consent if he executed such an affidavit on the
sixteenth day after the child's birth.
Further, the Uniform Parentage Act provides "that any interested party may
bring an action at any time for the purpose of determining the existence or
nonexistence of the father and child relationship presumed" by the execution of
an affidavit filed with the Department of Health, pursuant to Missouri Revised
Statutes § 193.087 Again, a man may appropriately file an action pursuant to
the Uniform Parentage Act sixteen days after the birth of the child, yet his
4. Mo. REv. STAT. § 453.005.3 (Supp. 1997).
5. Mo. REv. STAT. § 453.010.1 (Supp. 1997).
6. Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.010.2 (Supp. 1997).
7. Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.0 10 (Supp. 1997).
8. Mo. REv. STAT. § 453.030.3 (Supp. 1997).
9. Mo. REv. STAT. § 210.826.2 (1994).
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consent to the adoption now may not be required pursuant to Missouri Revised
Statutes § 453.030.3.
In addition, Missouri Revised Statutes § 453.040 has been amended to
provide that consent to the adoption is not required of a parent whose identity is
unknown and cannot be ascertained at the time of the filing of the petition to
adopt.'" No provisions require the consent of a parent if the identity of that
parent is discovered after the filing of the petition to adopt. Further, consent is
not required from a man who has not been determined to be the father and who
executes a verified statement denying paternity and relinquishing any interest he
may have in the child. Such a statement must provide that it is irrevocable and
that it follows the requirements for consents as set forth in Section 453.030. "
Finally, no consent is required of a parent who has not executed a consent and
who, after proper service, defaults in a proceeding for adoption or for
termination of parental rights.
The specific requirements for the consent to the adoption are different for
the mother and father. For the natural mother, Missouri Revised Statutes §
453.030 provides that the written consent to the adoption shall not be executed
before the child is forty-eight hours old.'3 The consent shall be executed before
a judge or notary public; alternatively, the consent may be executed before two
adult witnesses present at the time of consent, who identify the party signing the
consent form and certify that the consent is knowingly and freely given. 4 The
consent of the father, if required, may be executed before or after the institution
of the adoption proceedings and shall be acknowledged either by a notary public
or before two adult witnesses who are not the prospective adoptive parents and
who will verify the identity of the person signing the consent.'5 Both consents
shall be presented to the court for review and approval as soon as practicable,
and the consents may be withdrawn at any time, until they have been reviewed
and accepted by the judge. 6
The consent form must be developed by the Department of Social Services
and promulgated through rules and regulations. 7 At a minimum, the consent
form must specify that "[t]he birth parent understands the importance of
identifying all possible fathers of the child, and shall provide the names of all
such persons unless the mother has good cause as to why she should not name
such persons."'" It is up to the court to determine whether good cause exists to
10. Mo. REv. STAT. § 453.040 (Supp. 1997).
11. Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.040.4 (Supp. 1997).
12. Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.040.5 (Supp. 1997).
13. MO. REV. STAT. § 453.030.5 (Supp. 1997).
14. Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.030.5 (Supp. 1997).
15. Mo. REv. STAT. § 453.030.4 (Supp. 1997).
16. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 453.030.6, 453.030.7 (Supp. 1997).
17. MO. REV. STAT. § 453.030.8 (Supp. 1997).
18. Mo. REv. STAT. § 453.030.9(1) (Supp. 1997).
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excuse the mother from disclosing the name of any or all men who may be the
father of the child. The natural mother, by signing the consent, certifies that all
available information necessary to locate the natural father has been provided to
those persons having an interest in the child. There is no definition for "good
cause" as used in this subsection, nor is there a penalty specified should the
natural mother withhold information required by the consent form. In addition,
Missouri Revised Statutes § 211.444, concerning consents to the termination of
parental rights, was amended to be consistent with the requirements for consents
to adoption pursuant to Missouri Revised Statutes §§ 453.030.4 and 453.030.5.19
Missouri Revised Statutes § 453.110 provides that no transfer of custody
of a child for the purpose of adoption shall occur without a petition requesting
that the court approve such transfer. The violation of this provision is a class D
felony.2 If such a transfer does occur without a prior court order, the court shall
order an investigation and report to be compiled as provided for in Missouri
Revised Statutes § 453.070 and shall make custody orders consistent with the
best interests of the child.2 However, there is no prohibition to making a pre-
adoptive placement if the right to supervise the placement and to resume custody
is retained by the person or agency making such a placement.' Upon a proper
petition and hearing, the court may order a transfer of custody if: (1) the family
assessment required by Section 453.070 has been filed and reviewed; (2) the
guardian ad litem has recommended placement; (3) the petition for transfer of
custody or termination of parental rights has been filed, along with the financial
statement required by Section 453.075; (4) the assessment of the child required
by Section 453.026 has been filed, and (5) there has been compliance with the
Indian Child Welfare Act and the Interstate Compact on Child Placement,
pursuant to Missouri Revised Statutes § 210.620.' However, no hearing is
necessary if all the conditions required in Subsection 6 are met, the parties agree,
the court grants leave, and there has been a termination of the natural parents'
rights pursuant to Missouri Revised Statutes §§ 211.444 or 211.447.
Amendments to Missouri Revised Statutes § 453.075 provide that the
verified accounting of expenses to be prepared and filed by the petitioners may
include hospital, medical and physician expenses incurred by the natural mother
and child in connection with the birth, counseling services for the parent and
child for a reasonable time before and after the adoption, expenses incurred in
obtaining the pre- and post-placement assessments, legal expenses, court costs
and travel, as well as any other reasonable costs. 24
19. Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.444 (Supp. 1997).
20. Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.110.3 (Supp. 1997).
21. Mo. REv. STAT. § 453.110.2 (Supp. 1997).
22. Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.110.5 (Supp. 1997).
23. Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.110.6 (Supp. 1997).
24. Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.075.1 (Supp. 1997).
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Prior to the issuance of the order transferring custody of the child, pre-
placement assessments of both the child and the prospective adoptive parents are
to be performed, guided by regulations to be developed and promulgated by the
Department of Social Services.' The written report concerning the child shall
be provided to the prospective parents, the guardian ad litem and the court as
soon as practicable and prior to the placement of the child.26 Pursuant to
Missouri Revised Statutes § 453.077, when a child has been in an adoptive
placement for six months, a post-placement assessment, addressing the
emotional, physical and psychological status of the child, shall be done.27 The
specific contents of the post-placement assessment shall be determined by rules
promulgated by the Department of Social Services' Division of Family
Services.2 8 Prior to the issuance of the final decree of adoption, the court shall
conduct a hearing to determine whether the adoption should be finalized and
whether the petitioners had lawful and actual custody for six months. The court
also must determine that: post-placement assessments and final financial
information was submitted and reviewed; the recommendation of the guardian
ad litem was received; there is compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act
and Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, if applicable; and the
adoption is in the best interests of the child.29 The court does not have
continuing jurisdiction to deny continued contact between the birth parents.
Prior to the completion of the adoption, any communication between the birth
parents occurs at the discretion of the parties. Upon the issuance of the final
decree, further contact shall be at the discretion of the adoptive parents.30
2. Missouri Revised Statutes § 453.170: Foreign Adoptions
House Bill 343 also addresses foreign adoptions. Missouri Revised Statutes
§ 453.170 now provides that when an adoption occurs pursuant to the laws of
another state, Missouri will recognize that decree for all purposes.3' Subsection
2 provides that the state also shall recognize foreign adoptions already
recognized by the United States Department of Justice and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service.32 Upon the provision of proof of adoption required by
25. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 453.026, 453.070 (Supp. 1997).'
26. Mo. REv. STAT. § 453.026.1 (Supp. 1997).
27. Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.077 (Supp. 1997).
28. Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.077.1 (Supp. 1997). The rules and regulations to be
promulgated by the Department of Social Services will apply to the Division of Family
Services, any licensed child-placing agency, and any intermediary making child
placements, including attorneys, physicians, and clergy. Mo. REv. STAT. § 453.014
(Supp. 1997).
29. Mo. REv. STAT. § 453.080.1 (Supp. 1997).
30. Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.080.4 (Supp. 1997).
31. Mo. REv. STAT. § 453.170.1 (Supp. 1997).
32. Mo. REv. STAT. § 453.170.2 (Supp. 1997).
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Missouri Revised Statutes § 193.125, the Department of Health will issue a birth
certificate for the adopted child. Pursuant to Section 453.170.3, the adoptive
parents may petition the court for a change of name; in such action the court
shall recognize and give effect to the decree of adoption and shall enter an order
changing the name of the child as requested.33
The Missouri General Assembly also amended Missouri Revised Statutes
§ 193.125 to require that the Department of Health's Bureau of Vital Statistics
prepare birth certificates upon the receipt of proof of the adoption by a Missouri
resident. 4 If the proof contains the name of at least one of the adoptive parents,
a birth certificate shall be prepared in standard form." The proof of adoption
shall include a copy of the child's original birth certificate and decree of
adoption, an English translation of the documents and a copy of the approval of
the adoption from the Immigration and Naturalization Service.36
In an effort to ensure that all persons who may have an interest in a child
being adopted receive notification of a pending adoption, the putative father
registry maintained by the Department of Health and authorized by Missouri
Revised Statutes § 192.016 now is required to produce and distribute
publications which will inform the public about the registry, including the
procedures for voluntarily acknowledging paternity as well as the consequences
of failing to do so. 3' This information is to be provided to the Department of
Social Services, hospitals, libraries, clinics, and to other providers of child-
related services upon request.38
B. Missouri Revised Statutes § 211.447
The other major change House Bill 343 made was to Missouri Revised
Statutes § 211.447, concerning actions to terminate parental rights. Three new
grounds for termination were added. First, an order terminating parental rights
may be entered upon a finding that the parent has been found guilty or has pled
guilty to a felony sexual offense as defined in Missouri Revised Statutes Chapter
566, or to incest, pursuant to Missouri Revised Statutes § 564.020.
Secondly, the court also may order termination when it finds that the child
was conceived and born as a result of an act of forcible rape.39 Further, the
biological father's guilty plea or conviction of the crime of forcible rape is
conclusive evidence supporting the termination of the father's parental rights.
There is no indication that a plea or finding of guilt is necessary to proceed with
33. Mo. REv. STAT. § 453.170.3 (Supp. 1997).
34. Mo. REv. STAT. § 193.125.7 (Supp. 1997).
35. Mo. REV. STAT. § 193.125.7 (Supp. 1997).
36. Mo. REv. STAT. § 193.125.7 (Supp. 1997).
37. Mo. REV. STAT. § 192.016.7(2) (Supp. 1997).
38. Mo. REV. STAT. § 192.016.7(2) (Supp. 1997).
39. Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.447.2(5) (Supp. 1997).
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termination pursuant to this subsection. In fact, in circumstances in which there
is an acquittal or the prosecutor does not choose to pursue charges, the petition
to terminate may allege facts supporting the crime of forcible rape, and, upon
proof of the elements of the act by clear and convincing evidence, termination
may be ordered. There is no provision for the termination of parental rights for
the commission of crimes, other than forcible rape, involving acts which could
result in the conception of a child.40
The third addition to Missouri Revised Statutes § 211.447 authorizes the
court to enter an order terminating parental rights when it finds that the parent
is unfit to be a party to the parent-child relationship because of
a consistent pattern of committing a specific abuse, including but not limited
to, abuses as defined in Section 455.010 RSMo, child abuse or drug abuse
before the child or of specific conditions directly relating to the parent and
child relationship either of which are determined by the court to be of a
duration or nature that renders the parent unable, for the reasonably
foreseeable future, to care appropriately for the ongoing physical, mental or
emotional needs of the child.41
Inherent in a finding under this section is the determination that the parent
has engaged in a pattern of abusive behavior which, either by commission or
omission, directly impacts the parent-child relationship. The court also must
determine that the behavior is of a type that cannot be remedied within the
reasonably foreseeable future. In many respects, termination pursuant to this
section is similar to a termination entered pursuant to Section 211.447.2(3),
commonly referred to as "failure to rectify." Both sections recognize that, under
circumstances in which there may be no overt acts of abuse or neglect towards
the child, a parent may be pervasively unable to appropriately provide for the
child, to the extent that the child will be unable to thrive. Both sections also
recognize that the period of time in which a parent has to ameliorate the
conditions which led to the child being taken into care should be limited to the
shortest time possible.
However, interesting differences exist between the two sections. First,
Section 211.447.2(3) requires that the child be under the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court for one year, whereas Section 211.447.2(6) requires only that the
conditions render the parent unable to appropriately care for the child for the
reasonably foreseeable future. This distinction can be significant now that
termination can be ordered under circumstances in which, prior to the
amendments, the child would have had to wait a full year before the petition
could be filed. Secondly, Section 211.447.2(3) requires proof that the likelihood
40. Examples are statutory rape, pursuant to Missouri Revised Statutes Sections
566.032 and 566.034, and sexual assault, pursuant to Missouri Revised Statutes Section
566.040.
41. Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.447.2(6) (Supp. 1997).
1998]
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is small that the conditions leading to the child coming into care can be
remedied; Section 211.447.2(6) requires only that such conditions will continue
to exist for the foreseeable future. Because of this distinction, the inquiry of the
court under this subdivision no longer extends to the issue of whether, from the
standpoint of the parents, all conceivable avenues to salvage the family have
been pursued. Rather, the focus shifts to whether, from the child's perspective,
the amount of time necessary for the parent to overcome the barriers to
reunification is unreasonable, as measured by the child's need for permanency
at the earliest possible date. There also is no requirement in Section
211.447.2(6) that the petitioner show that the continuation of the parent-child
relationship will adversely affect the child's ability to integrate into an adoptive
or other permanent home, as required by Section 211.447.2(3).
Missouri Revised Statutes § 211.447.2(6) also provides a presumption of
parental unfitness upon a showing that there has been an involuntary termination
of parental rights pursuant to Missouri Revised Statutes § 211.447.2(1), (2), (3)
or (4) within a three-year period immediately prior to the hearing on the petition
to terminate parental rights.42 When there has been an involuntary termination
of parental rights pursuant to Section 211.447.2(5) or (6) during the appropriate
time period, there is no presumption of parental unfitness.
Il. THE ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILIES ACT OF 1997
On November 13, 1997, President Clinton signed into law the "Adoption
and Safe Families Act of 1997," representing the first major revisions to the
"Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980."'  The Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act made fundamental changes to the way federal
funding for child welfare services was allocated and codified the philosophy of
permanency planning, primarily by incorporating the concept of "reasonable
efforts., 4 -' As a result, Missouri enacted Missouri Revised Statutes § 211.183,
which defined reasonable efforts as "the exercise of reasonable diligence and
care by the division to utilize all available services related to meeting the needs
of the juvenile and the family," and required that such efforts be made to
"prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child and, after removal, to
make it possible for the child to return home."' Section 211.183 also provided
that reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the child from the home need
not be made under circumstances in which the child could not be preserved in
42. Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.447.2(6) (Supp. 1997).
43. Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended in various sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 620, 670 (1994).
45. Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.183 (1994).
46. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.183.2 (1994).
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the home even with reasonable services.47 Finally, the court is required to make
specific findings on the issue of reasonable efforts in its order of disposition.48
The Adoption and Safe Families Act made substantial changes to the
reasonable efforts requirement by specifically providing that the child's health
and safety must be of paramount concern when determining whether reasonable
efforts were made.49 While it seems to state the obvious, this small change
represents a significant statement concerning the priorities of the child protection
system. Previously, the focus of reasonable efforts was placed upon preventing
removal of the child and, if removal was necessary, making it possible for the
child to return home at the earliest possible date. Now, the interests of the child
are given priority in determining what efforts are reasonable and when those
efforts should be made.
Additionally, the Adoption and Safe Families Act provides that reasonable
efforts shall not be required of the child welfare agency if:
1. the parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances (as
defined by state law, which definition may include but need not be limited
to abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse);
2. committed the murder of another child of the parent;
3. committed voluntary manslaughter of another child of the parent;
4. aided or abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited to commit such a
murder or such a voluntary manslaughter; or
5. committed a felony assault that results in serious bodily injury to the
child or another child of the parent; or
6. the parent's rights to a sibling have been terminated involuntarily."0
As to Subdivision (1), Missouri has no statute specifically defining what
"aggravated circumstances" might be. Furthermore, there is no indication
whether a criminal conviction is necessary before Subdivisions (2) through (5)
can be applied. If conviction is necessary, the ability of courts to compel
parental performance in family treatment plans will be severely hampered
because the parents' focus will be on their rights as criminal defendants, rather
than rehabilitation. An interpretation of the Adoption and Safe Families Act
requiring criminal conviction would be contrary to the legislative
purpose-timely permanency for children.
If the juvenile court determines that reasonable efforts are not required, the
court must hold a permanency hearing within thirty days to determine the
permanency plan for the child."' Subsequent to that hearing, the child welfare
47. Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.183.4 (1994).
48. Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.183.5 (1994).
49. 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a)(15)(A) (West Supp. 1997).
50. 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i)-(iii) (West Supp. 1997).
51. 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a)(15)(E)(i) (West Supp. 1997).
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agency shall make reasonable efforts to place the child in accordance with the
permanency plan and take steps to finalize the permanent placement.52
Concurrent planning, or providing an alternate permanency plan in addition
to reunification, also was endorsed by the Act. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. §
671(a)(15)(F) provides that "reasonable efforts to place a child for adoption or
with a legal guardian may be made concurrently with reasonable efforts" as
provided for by law.53 Designed for children who come into care under
circumstances in which their return home is unlikely, this section provides child
protection agencies a "back-up plan" when efforts to reunify children with their
families fail. Thus valuable time and resources may be saved.
Prior to enactment of the Adoption and Safe Families Act, services were
provided to families until such services no longer were reasonable or in the
child's best interests. At that point, an alternative permanency plan was created
for the child. Such plan might include termination of parental rights for
adoption, guardianship with an appropriate relative, or emancipation and
independent living. The alternative permanency plan often is litigated for long
periods of time, leaving the child in "temporary" foster care. Concurrent
planning was devised as an alternative to this "sequential planning" form of case
management. The philosophical basis for concurrent planning is the belief that
every child needs permanent relationships with adults who will provide for their
physical, emotional and psychological needs. Having garnered the support of
the Adoption and Safe Families Act, concurrent planning should be able to be
implemented without encountering the legal challenge that reunification must be
pursued at all costs before adoption or guardianship may be considered.
For those families that can be reunified, the Act provides for an extension
of funding for time-limited family preservation or reunification services. These
services may include: individual and faiily counseling, substance abuse
treatment, mental health services, services designed to address domestic
violence, temporary child care, and transportation to effectuate the assistance
given. These services are limited to fifteen months beginning on the date the
child enters foster care.54 For purposes of the Act, a child is deemed to have
entered foster care on the earlier of two dates: the day of the first judicial finding
that the child has been the victim of abuse or neglect or sixty days after the child
was removed from the home. Arguably, in Missouri, the first judicial
determination that the child has been the victim of abuse or neglect occurs at the
protective custody hearing, held within seventy-two hours of the parent's request
for the hearing and as early as three days after removal.
The Adoption and Safe Families Act also decreased the time allowed for the
disposition hearing, provided for in Missouri Revised Statutes § 210.720, from
52. 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a)(15)(E)(ii) (West Supp. 1997).
53. 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a)(15)(F) (West Supp. 1997).
54. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 629(a), 629(d)(1) (West Supp. 1997).
55. 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(5)(F) (West Supp. 1997).
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eighteen months to twelve months after the initial placement. 6 In addition, this
hearing is re-named the "permanency hearing," the purpose of which is to
determine the permanent plan for the child." Specifically, the court is to
determine whether: the child should be returned home; the child should continue
in foster care, with the goal of reunifying the child with his family; the
guardianship with other family members is appropriate; or proceedings to
terminate parental rights to free the child for adoption should be instituted. s8
Additionally, 42 U.S.C. § 675(5) has been amended to provide that foster
parents, pre-adoptive parents or relatives providing care for a child are entitled
to notice of all hearings concerning the child, and an opportunity to be heard at
those hearings.5 9 However, the foster parents, pre-adoptive parents or relatives
are not deemed to be parties simply on the basis of having the right to notice and
opportunity to be heard.6
There are circumstances in which the pursuit of termination of parental
rights is mandated. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5) now provides that the state must initiate
actions to terminate parental rights when: the child has been in foster care for
fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months; the court has determined that the
child is an abandoned infant (as defined by state law); or the parent has
committed murder or voluntary manslaughter, or aided and abetted, attempted
to commit, conspired or solicited to commit murder or voluntary manslaughter
of another child in the home or felony assault resulting in serious bodily harm
to the child or another child in the home. Under these circumstances, the state
also is required to plan concurrently to place the child for adoption or
guardianship. The state may opt not to pursue termination of parental rights
when the child is being cared for by a relative at the option of the state, when the
child's case plan documents "a compelling reason for determining that filing
such a petition would not be in the best interests of the child," or when the state
has not provided reasonable efforts to the family as required by law.6' Presently,
there is no guidance regarding what would be a "compelling reason" for the state
to opt not to file a petition to terminate parental rights. Ideally, the primary
consideration in that determination will be the needs of children.
Also, time limits for complying with the mandated termination provisions
are established. Regarding children who currently are in alternative care, the
state must come into compliance for one-third of the children within six months
after the end of the first regular legislative session, and for two-thirds of the
children the state must comply within twelve months. The state must be in full
compliance not later that eighteen months after the end of the first regular
56. 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(5)(C) (West Supp. 1997).
57. 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(5)(C) (West Supp. 1997).
58. 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(5)(C) (West Supp. 1997).
59. 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(5)(C) (West Supp. 1997).
60. 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(5)(C) (West Supp. 1997).
61. 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(5)(C) (West Supp. 1997).
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session.62 For children entering foster care after November 13, 1997, if the state
comes into compliance with the Act after the child has been in care fifteen
months, the state shall comply with the provisions for mandatory termination
within three months after the end of the first regular session of the legislature.63
Preference is given to those children in care for the longest periods of time.'
The Adoption and Safe Families Act also contains adoption promotion
provisions, the first of which requires the child welfare agency to document steps
the agency takes to find an adoptive home or other permanent arrangement for
each child whose permanency plan is adoption.65 The state also is required to
document, at a minimum, child-specific recruitment efforts for each child
available for adoption.' Additionally, the Department of Health and Human
Services is to provide funding for adoption incentive payments and technical
assistance to eligible states for the promotion of adoption of foster children.
Technical assistance may include development of practice guidelines for
expediting terminations, concurrent planning, risk assessment tools to identify
children at high risk of harm should they be returned home, and models to
expedite the placement of children under the age of one year into pre-adoptive
homes.'
To promote adoptions, states now may provide health insurance coverage
for adoptive children who are determined to have special medical needs within
the adoption subsidy agreement between the state and adoptive parents, when
the child could not be placed without medical assistance.68 Further, if the prior
adoption has failed or the adoptive parents have died, then any child who is
eligible for adoption subsidy payments shall continue to be eligible for such
payments.69 Finally, the state is required to develop a plan for the use of "cross-
jurisdictional resources to facilitate timely adoptive or permanent placements for
waiting children."7
IV. MissouRi SUPREME COURT RULES
On December 9, 1997, the Missouri Supreme Court issued major revisions
to the rules governing practice and procedure in the juvenile courts. These
changes will take effect on January 1, 1999. The changes recognize the
62. 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(5)(C) (West Supp. 1997).
63. 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(5)(C) (West Supp. 1997).
64. 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(5)(C) (West Supp. 1997).
65. 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(1) (West Supp. 1997).
66. 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(l)(E) (West Supp. 1997).
67. 42 U.S.C.A. § 670 (West Supp. 1997).
68. 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a)(21) (West Supp. 1997).
69. 42 U.S.C.A. § 673(a)(2)(c) (West Supp. 1997).
70. 42 U.S.C.A. § 622(b)(72) (West Supp. 1997).
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distinctions, both procedural and philosophical, between proceedings involving
abuse and neglect and proceedings involving juvenile delinquency.
A. Abuse and Neglect
The amendments regarding children suffering from abuse or neglect require
any person authorized to take custody of a juvenile to provide a written report
to the juvenile officer assigned to the case, detailing the reason the child was
taken into custody.7 Two types of protective custody now are recognized:
"emergency protective custody '7 and "temporary protective custody."'73
Pursuant to Rule 111.11, a child may be taken into emergency custody by either
a law enforcement official or a physician when there is "reasonable cause to
believe that the juvenile is in imminent danger of suffering serious physical harm
or a threat to life that may occur before a court could issue a protective custody
order or before a juvenile officer could take the juvenile into temporary
protective custody."74 The jurisdiction of the juvenile court attaches at the time
the juvenile is taken into emergency protective custody and extends until the
child is placed into temporary protective custody by the juvenile officer.75
Emergency protective custody may not exceed twelve hours.76
To retain protective custody of a child after the duration of the emergency
protective custody, the juvenile officer must have "reasonable cause to believe
that the juvenile is without proper care, custody or support and that temporary
protective custody is necessary to prevent personal harm to the juvenile."'77 The
juvenile may be held in temporary protective custody for up to twenty-four hours
unless otherwise authorized by the juvenile court.78 If the initial twenty-four
hour period of temporary protective custody expires without an extension from
the juvenile court, then the juvenile officer must release the child.79
To extend the period of temporary protective custody beyond twenty-four
hours, the juvenile officer must file a petition in the juvenile court alleging that
probable cause exists to believe the juvenile is without proper care, custody or
support, and that the juvenile's circumstances require an extension of temporary
protective custody.8" If the juvenile remains in temporary protective custody, the
71. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 111.02(b).
72. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 111.11.
73. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 111.12.
74. Mo. SUP. CT. R. 111.1 (a).
75. Mo. SuP.CT.R. 1ll.11(b).
76. Mo.SuP.CT.R. 111.11(c).
77. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 111.12(b).
78. Mo. SuP. CT.R. 111.12(d).
79. Mo. Sup. CT.R. 111.12(e).
80. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 111.13(a).
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juvenile court shall notify the parties in writing of the right to a protective
custody hearing.8'
Upon the request of any party, the juvenile court shall conduct a protective
custody hearing within three days of the request.82 At the protective custody
hearing, the court must receive evidence relevant to whether the child should
remain in protective custody. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court will
order either that the child remain in protective custody or be released. 83 If
protective custody is continued, the court shall review the case every thirty days
until an order of disposition has been entered.84
A written request for the release of a juvenile in protective custody may be
filed by the juvenile, the juvenile's custodian, the guardian ad litem or the
juvenile officer. The juvenile may be released upon a determination by the court
that a change of circumstances makes protective custody no longer necessary."
The court may make this determination without a hearing, or may set a hearing
"as soon as practicable." '
B. Juvenile Delinquency
According to the amendments regarding juvenile delinquency, a juvenile
who allegedly has committed a violation of the law must be released to his
custodian unless detention has been authorized.87 When the juvenile court is
notified that a juvenile is being held, it must order either the juvenile's release
or retention until a detention hearing can be held.88
The court may order detention only upon a petition alleging that the
juvenile has committed acts bringing him under the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court89 and a finding of probable cause to believe the juvenile committed the
alleged acts.9" If the court orders detention, the juvenile may not be held for
more than twenty-four hours, unless the court finds that the juvenile has violated
conditions of a prior court order establishing conditions of behavior for the
juvenile and the juvenile has a record of willfully failing to appear at court
proceedings, engaging in conduct causing physical harm to himself or others, or
leaving court-ordered placements without permission. 9'
81. Mo. Sup. CT.R. 11.13(c).
82. Mo. Sup. CT. R. I11. 14(a).
83. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 11.14(c).
84. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 111.14(d).
85. Mo. SuP. CT. R. 11.15(a), (b).
86. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 111.15(c); Mo. Sup. CT. R. 119.01.
87. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 111.02(c).
88. Mo. Sup. Cr. R. 111.07(a).
89. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.031 (1994).
90. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 111.07(a)(2).
91. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 111.07(b).
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V. MISSOURI CASES
Probably the most significant event of 1996 for children's advocates was
the approval of the Guardian Ad Litem Standards by the Missouri Supreme
Court. While not enacted into rule, the standards provide guidance to lawyers
as to their roles as children's representatives and the duties they must undertake
to adequately perform that role.
The first case in Missouri to address the duties of the guardian ad litem after
the standards were approved was not a juvenile case but, rather, a case involving
the modification of a divorce decree concerning custody of a child. In Baumgart
v. Baumgart,92 the mother appealed the trial court's denial of her motion to
modify the divorce decree concerning custody of the parties' daughter.
Specifically, the mother alleged that the joint custody decree should be modified
to grant her full custody of her children due to sexual abuse of the daughter by
the father.93 Evidence of the abuse was presented at two hearings on the motion.
In the trial court's order, the judge found that there were substantial and
continuing changed circumstances making the decree unreasonable. Thus, the
judge found the decree should be modified.94 However, the court did not change
the custodial provisions. Instead, the court left custody of the children with the
father subject to the mother's rights of visitation, and the mother appealed."
The Western District Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case,
holding that the guardian ad litem failed to properly discharge his duty to
investigate and report the allegations of abuse.96 Specifically, the court found
that the record was incomplete and insufficient as to the allegations of abuse,
though what information was present supported the appointment of a guardian
ad litem pursuant to Missouri Revised Statutes § 452.423.l."' The court also
discussed, in detail, the duties of the guardian enumerated in Section 452.423.2:
presenting witnesses to offer testimony; conducting the necessary inquiry to
determine the best interests of the child; interviewing the child where
appropriate; and, if the guardian finds that the allegations of abuse are sufficient,
referring the matter to the juvenile officer for further investigation and the
possible filing of a petition pursuant to Missouri Revised Statutes Chapter 211.98
Citing In re Interest of JL.H.99 and Guier v. Guier,00 the court stated,
"[w]hile [the guardian] is not required to make an explicit recommendation as
92. 944 S.W.2d 572 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
93. Id. at 574.
94. Id. at 575.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 580.
97. Id. at 578.
98. Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.423.2(3) (Supp. 1997).
99. 647 S.W.2d 852, 867 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
100. 918 S.W.2d 940, 952 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
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to child custody, the statutes and cases are clear that it is imperative that the
guardian ad litem investigate and have input on the perspective of the child's
best interest ... [,that] this be presented to the trial judge, and that he be active
in determining the best interest of children.'' ° At trial, the guardian presented
no witnesses, asked few questions of those witnesses presented, did not
interview the child who was alleged to have been abused, did not refer the matter
to the juvenile officer for further investigation, and did not make a
recommendation concerning custody or visitation. The Western District found
that these failures resulted in the insufficiency of the record on the issues of
abuse. Therefore, the court remanded the cause for the appointment of a new
guardian ad litem, a thorough investigation of all allegations of abuse, and a full
and prompt hearing on the merits of the mother's motion to modify. '" Clearly,
the guardian is significantly more than a passive recipient of information from
the other parties to the litigation. The guardian must independently determine
the impact of allegations of abuse upon the child's best interests from all
available sources. If there is insufficient information, it is incumbent upon the
guardian to obtain additional information upon which the guardian or the court
may make decisions concerning the child. To do less is a failure of the
guardian's duty to protect the best interests of the child.
The Western District Court of Appeals held in In re N.JB. v. State 3 that
allegations in a juvenile petition pursuant to Missouri Revised Statutes §
211.031.1(3) must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. In that case, a
juvenile was alleged to have committed acts which would have amounted to
unwanted sexual contact in violation of Missouri Revised Statutes § 566.090 but
for the fact that the contact occurred through the clothing of the female. The
juvenile court found the juvenile to be under its jurisdiction at the time these
events occurred. The court found the allegations to be true beyond a reasonable
doubt and committed the juvenile to the custody of the Missouri Department of
Social Services' Division of Youth Services. 1 4
The juvenile appealed, alleging that the facts were insufficient to support
the juvenile court's findings. The Western District agreed with the State that the
proper burden of proof was clear and convincing evidence when the action is a
motion to modify a previous juvenile disposition. The court relied on Missouri
Supreme Court Rule 117.05(b), which states that in all hearings before the
juvenile court the burden of proof is clear and convincing evidence except when
the hearing is pursuant to a petition alleging as a basis for juvenile court
jurisdiction acts which would be a crime if committed as an adult.'0° In those
cases, the burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt.
101. Baumgart, 944 S.W.2d at 579.
102. Id. at 580.
103. 941 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
104. Id. at 783.
105. Id. at 785.
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The Western District also addressed the issue of granting custody of a child
in ajuvenile action to a third party in In re Hill.10 6 In 1991, a child was born to
an un-wed mother who left the child with her brother and sister-in-law. The
juvenile court eventually ordered that the brother retain physical custody under
the supervision of the Division of Family Services. The child's status remained
the same until 1994, when the child's father surfaced. After the father's
paternity was confirmed by genetic testing, the father began to visit regularly
with the child. In 1995, during a review hearing, the court ordered that the child
remain in his placement, finding that "special or extraordinary reasons" required
the placement. On appeal, the father claimed: (1) the court erred in failing to
require the juvenile officer to rebut the presumption that he was fit and proper
as the child's custodian; (2) Missouri law wrongfully places the child's best
interests before his presumed right to custody; and (3) the court erred in
retroactively applying child welfare legislation to the case. 1 7
As to the father's first point, the court cited In re Marriage of Carter0 8 and
C.M. W. v. C. V. 09 in holding that the presumption of the fitness of a natural
parent is rebutted when there exist "special and extraordinary reasons that
custody be granted to someone other than the parent for the child's well-being,
regardless of whether or not the evidence establishes the unfitness of the natural
parent."'" The court held that even though there was no express finding that the
father was unfit, substantial evidence of his unfitness existed. The evidence
consisted of factual findings regarding the bonding of the child to the custodians
and the psychological harm to the child that would result from his being
removed from his current placement."'
As to the second claim-that the child's best interests were improperly
placed before the father's fundamental rights as a parent-the court found that
there was no violation of the father's rights because the father continued to have
regular visitation with his son, the Division continued to offer services to reunite
the family, and the father had a continuing right to petition the court for a change
of custody at any time. The court declined to rule on the father's third point on
appeal and affirmed the trial court's judgement."'
VI. CONCLUSION
1997 proved to be a pivotal year for Missouri's children. The legislative
and judicial changes described in this Article indicate a move away from a child
106. 937 S.W.2d 384 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
107. Id. at 386.
108. 794 S.W.2d 321, 325 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
109. 786 S.W.2d 623, 624 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
110. Hill, 937 S.W.2d at 386.
111. Id. at 387.
112. Id. at 388.
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protection process laden with delay and uncertainty to a process that makes
children's need for permanency its first priority. Nonetheless, significant issues
remain. First, the issue of adequate funding for court-appointed guardians ad
litem and juvenile court personnel will be preeminent as the impact of the
legislative changes begins to be felt. Additionally, the judiciary will be hard
pressed for court time and docket priority for juvenile cases. Service providers
and public entities charged with protecting children will be taxed to the limit of
their resources. Thus, the groundwork for reform has been laid. It remains to
be seen whether 1998 will bring resolutions to these remaining issues and
whether true systemic reform will continue.
18
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss2/8
